Plato’s Theory of Ideas Essay

Plato’s theory of Ideas addresses the problem of change. As we experience the world we experience it as change. As Heraclitus puts it, all things are in flux (Barnes 58). Things change through time, and they also change through space, via motion. One never steps in the same river twice. But against this ancient wisdom of Heraclitus there is also the wisdom of Parmenides, who proclaims that nothing ever changes, because whatever exists necessarily has permanent existence (Ibid 245). Parmenides is seen to have posed the problem of being and non-being which had bedeviled the Greeks for long, before Plato affected reconciliation through his Theory of Ideas. The points of view of both Heraclitus and Parmenides are valid, he says, because they are speaking of different modes of existence. Heraclitus describes the phenomenal world, whereas Parmenides the transcendental one. Parmenides speaks of the higher truth, of true and unchanging reality. This is the reality of Ideas, and which we do not experience directly. Heraclitus’ wisdom is the lesser one, but hardly insignificant. It is the reality of the phenomenal world, and the one which we experience directly. It is the world as framed by time and space, and therefore characterized by perpetual change. Plato’s theory concerns the relationship between the two realities. Change is the fundamental problem that we face. There are two aspects to this problem, one moral, and the other metaphysical. First to consider the metaphysical. Realities are all we ever seek. The non-real repels us, for it is of the same substance as error, illusion, or imperfection. But how real can we accept that which is never the same in two successive instances, or in two different locations. The best we can say of such reality is that it is transient. It is as if we have a glimpse of reality, but it doesn’t persist, and is instantaneously replaced by another reality. At this point we may come to the rash conclusion that there is nothing that is permanently real, as do the nihilists. Another equally rash conclusion is that, while there is an objective reality, it is beyond our reach, which is the conclusion of the skeptics. But nihilism does not account for intelligibility and comprehension. We clearly understand the comprehend the world beyond, which means that there is something there to understand, which in turn means there is something real. The same argument may be used to dispel skepticism too. The moral dimension to the problem of change involves a similar argument, this time introducing the concepts of virtue, justice and beauty. Such qualities are indispensable to human existence. If there was nothing called virtue and justice, we would not be able to live with our neighbors at all. If there was nothing called beauty, we would be deprived of the very motive force that carries us through life. But no one has ever come to agree as to what these entities are, and each arrives at a subjective estimation. Such relativism, in the first instance, seems to refute the existence of justice or beauty as properly existent entities in themselves. At the same time the tangible existence of human society tells us that justice and beauty necessary exist, even though no one can put a finger on it. The conviction that there is a thing called justice is part of the moral life. Change is thus a measure of imperfection. Material objects are mutable; therefore they can only be imperfect copies of real entities – the Ideas. This is true for either tangible objects, or abstract qualities, such as virtue and justice. We recognize a ball because it is round, but do we actually perceive roundness directly? Roundness is a geometrical concept that we are able to understand, but we can never come across something that is perfectly round in the material world. No one has ever seen perfect roundness, and yet we are able recognize something as round immediately. This can only mean that roundness is an innate concept of the mind. We are allowed to compare real objects with this archetype, so that whenever something is â€Å"nearly† round, then we call it round. The roundness of the ball is an imperfect copy of the archetypical roundness – and the latter is what we call the Idea of roundness. In the same way the ball is composed of the copies of other Ideas, such as redness, hardness, bounciness, if we have a red, hard and bouncy ball. All these qualities come together to make the material object, which is the ball, and this is a mutable entity. The Ideas, however, never change. It is because the Ideas have permanency that we are able to comprehend the ball for what it is. For if the forms, such as roundness and hardness, had no fixity, then there is no hope for intelligibility at all. Again, the material ball can be said to exist only because the Ideas have true existence, i.e. they retain their qualities at all times and in all places. Therefore, material objects derive their existence from the transcendental existence of Ideas. It is a transient, and therefore limited existence, when we compare it to the true existence of Ideas. We therefore have two levels of existence, one of Ideas, and the other of material things. The Ideas we may denote as Entities, they only having true existence. Material things also have existence, but only in a transient way, so we must say that they do not truly exist. They derive both their intelligibility and their existence by dint of their being copies of the Entities. The Entities are perfect, because they are immutable. Material objects, on the other hand, are mutable, which reflects the fact that they are imperfect copies of archetypical forms. In one of the most famous passages of Plato, which has come to be known as â€Å"The Myth of the Cave†, we find a vivid illustration of the structure of reality as envisaged by Plato (Marias 48). Socrates (Plato) asks his audience to imagine a curious type of cave dweller. They have spent all their lives inside the cave, and not only that, but they are chained and restricted in such a way that they must sit facing the wall of the cave, and cannot even turn their necks to see what goes on behind their backs. In this posterior region there is a path, and even further back a fire blazes. There are bearers walking along the path and carrying objects. The shadows of these objects fall onto the cave wall. These shadows constitute all that the cave dwellers ever see. The objects that the bearers carry are real, and are likened to the Entities. The shadows are likened to the material objects. The first thing to notice is that they are indistinct and imperfect copies of the real things. The second thing is that they are mutable, meaning that the shadows flicker and give a perpetually changing outline. Compared to this the Entities are solid and immutable. Socrates further goes on to consider what it implies if the cave dwellers are released from their shackles, and then led out of the cave into the broad daylight. They see things now with the maximum of clarity, and we may liken such seeing as experiencing the Entities themselves. Compared to the puny and indistinct shadows inside the cave, the real things have far more clarity. By letting the cave dweller out, Plato is suggesting that there is escape from the cage of phenomenal existence, and that man spans the gap between the two realms, experiencing material things on the one hand, but with the latent possibility of knowing the ultimately real too. The question then arises as to how we should deal with change. We can either accept change as the final judgment, which means that we will not allow Plato’s transcendental realm of Ideas. Such a stance is known as relativism, because all things are now only relative to each other. With relativism all points of view must be accepted as valid, and there will no underlining objectivity to it all. Either this, or we accept Plato’s theory of forms. But relativism by itself is absurd. Even the statement â€Å"relativism is true† has meaning only if it is objective. Since relativism denies objectivity, the statement is self-contradictory, therefore false. This means that we must fall back on Plato’s theory of Ideas. But a multiplicity of Ideas also entails relativism, for these too must be mutually related to each other. To expel all relativism we must ultimately arrive at the â€Å"Idea of the Ideas†, the single Idea form which all others must stem (Ibid 53). It is what Plato calls the transcendental Good. Since we cannot apprehend Entities, how are we to arrive at truth? Plato says that it is through reconciliation. We are perpetually striving towards objectivity, which is the common ground to all points of view. Therefore, there is a universally operative force by which all things mutually attract each other. Plato calls this eros – or love. This is the motive force that propels all things, and leads to truth. The process of reconciliation is where opposite points of view come together, and there is gradual expansion of the common ground. The process, therefore, sets before us a hierarchy of truth. At the lower end is the particular and the subjective; at the higher end is the general and the objective. In terms of change we say that, at one end of the hierarchy is the transient and ever-changing, and the other is the permanent and immutable truth. We proceed from the lower end of the hierarchy to the higher. The same hierarchy is reflected in all things that we observe in the material world. There is the hierarchy of the inert and the living. Among the living there is the hierarchy of the insentient plants and the sentient animals. Among both these groups we find an infinitely nuanced hierarchy, with man at the summit of it all. Even among man there is a hierarchy, reflected the stages of spiritual development, whereby material attachment is gradually shed. Plato speaks of a nine fold hierarchy that spans from the tyrant to the philosopher (Ibid 47). To illustrate how the condition of man came to be, Plato describes (in the Phaedrus) a mystical vision as it comes to Socrates while meditating on the banks if the Illysus. He sees the soul of man being carried by two winged horses, one of which is unruly (denoting the senses and the passions), and the other is calm (denoting the mind). Reason is the driver in the middle, and he carries the soul over heaven, so that the soul has glimpsed the eternal and unchanging truth. But in the end reason cannot manage the unmatched steeds, so that the horses lose their wings, and the soul fall to earth, taking on a material body. If it was not for the glimpse of heaven, the fallen soul would only be ranked among the beasts. But the special condition of man is that he straddles the divide between the material and the eternal. He must persist in a material body, but where the wings have been clipped there is aching longing to fly again. The aching is further exacerbated by the recollection of heaven. The soul which has once experienced eternity can never forget it. The faculty of reason itself is but an act of remembering of having once flown over heaven. Through reason man may guide his soul back to heaven, through the acquisition of wisdom. The rational perception of material things is therefore an act of remembering. Material objects are therefore only the signposts that lead the way back to heaven. Socrates puts this most beautifully in the following way: â€Å"The virtue of wings consists in lifting heavy things upwards, bearing them through the air to the place where the gods reside† (qtd. in Marias 48). In conclusion, Plato solves the problem of change by positing the existence of Ideas, which are the transcendental entities having eternal and unchanging existence. The theory describes a hierarchy of existence, with the unchanging Ideas residing at the summit, and the material objects below, which obtain both their existence and their intelligibility through being derived from the Ideas. Put in another way, the mutable objects are only imperfect copies of the perfect and immutable archetypes. The human condition is such that it remains in contact with both realms. While the human soul persists in the illusory and mutable realm of material objects, it nevertheless strives towards the objective and unchanging truth through the faculty of reason. The rational contemplation of material objects is therefore only a process or recollection of the higher truth which the soul was once privy to. From this point of view material objects are only signs that lead the way back to the ultimate truth, and wisdom is but a process of shedding material attachment. Works Cited Barnes, Jonathan. The Presocratic Philosophers. London: Routledge, 1982. Marà ­as, Julià ¡n. History of Philosophy. Chelmsford, MA: Courier Dover Publications, 1967.